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3EDITOR'S NOTE
State fragility, authoritarianism and stalled or on-going democratisation processes, all of which
in some ways define the African condition, makes Africa an interesting test case for the impact
of the internet and social media on the dynamics of conflict, peace and political transformation.
While social media platforms had arguably been assigned an outsized role in the outbreak and
unfolding of the ‘Arab Spring’ which began in North Africa, the initial euphoria and enthusiasm
regarding the emancipatory potential of social media has since cooled off appreciably.
Developments in Libya and Egypt coupled with the masterful exploitation of social media
platforms by ‘extremist’ groups for recruitment and propaganda purposes has underlined the
inherently Janus-faced nature of social media platforms, a point underscored by several articles
in this issue of the HAB.
The panoramic article by Desta reviews the Information and Communications Technology for
Peace (ICT4P) literature on the Horn of Africa (the Horn) and showcases the varying levels
towards which peacebuilders in the Horn have been able to exploit the internet and social
media for conflict transformation and peace-building. His article shows that it is Kenya, the
country with the highest internet penetration in the Horn, where several social media tools
have been developed for conflict management and conflict transformation. On the other hand,
the Ethiopian case is noteworthy for initiatives such as the WoredaNet, SchoolNet, etc. which
have utilised the internet for socio-economic programs. The article by Omanga is an interesting
piece which focuses on two cases where social media tools were deployed to enhance
community policing and also to enable grassroots political deliberation. The empirically rich
article by Omanga’s explores the potential of social media to improve governance at the local
level and as a tool to expand political participation and provides valuable lessons for the rest of
the Horn. His article shows how the internet and social media have allowed actors and citizens
to transcend the limits of traditional channels and processes of political participation.
In much of Africa where independent traditional media (radio, TV, and print media) are either
absent or operate under tight constraints, the internet and social media can acquire an outsized
importance and impact creating new channels of interaction and communication and enabling
those who were previously ‘quiescent’ or ‘detached’ to participate in the public sphere. Across
Africa and more so in the Horn social media platforms provide access to information and news
outside the strictures of the authoritarian state and provide what little space there is for
relatively autonomous debate and discussion. Interestingly, there is a growing tendency
whereby the messaging and narratives articulated in state controlled traditional media are
increasingly being challenged by counter-narratives and discourse generated in social media.
Social media has also emerged as a key site for opposition ideological and organisational
mobilisation against governments in power as underlined by recent events in Ethiopia, Uganda,
Sudan, and Eritrea. In response, governments across Africa, in Egypt (2011), the Democratic
Republic of Congo (January 2015), the Republic of Congo (2016) and closer to home in Ethiopia,
Uganda, and Kenya have also utilised internet restrictions and in more extreme cases imposed
full-fledged shutdowns of the internet in the context of electoral contests or large scale
protests. A related development has been the growing expansion of legislation and policies in
relation to the cyber realm including social media, that have the general goal of expanding
state control over the internet and social media content, and penalising individuals and content
providers producing content deemed ‘offensive’ or threatening to national security.
However, the dual nature and effect of social media alluded to earlier remains critical in terms
of understanding, the correlation between social media activism and conflict, stability and
peace, above all in the Horn of Africa. The articles by Michael and Carver focusing on Ethiopia
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to generate ‘fake news’ and incite hatred and conflict. Michael’s article underlines the tendency
towards the emergence of the cyber-realm as a field of political contestation coupled with the
attendant process of the securitisation of the cyber-sphere. Carver’s article on the South Sudan
at the same time shows how social media activism and its effects on peace and conflict in the
Horn of Africa is inextricably linked to processes such as migration and the emergence of
Diaspora communities coupled with the advent of satellite television and internet enabled
money transfer schemes.
The article by Thomas focuses on internet shutdowns in the Horn which interestingly debunks
the conventional wisdom that holds governments as solely responsible for internet shutdowns.
His article discusses cases where internet service providers (ISPs) have been forced to cease
their operations based on threats or actions by governments outside the Horn or ‘extremist’
movements.
The articles in this issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin, in spite of their divergent thematic and
geographical focus, emphasise certain themes: the inherent contradiction exemplified in the
immense potential of the internet and social media for new and emancipatory politics coupled
with their instrumentalisation to incite conflict and hate; the process of expanding state
regulation and surveillance over the cyber realm which at the same time is being countered
through recourse to tools and platforms designed to evade control. A recurring theme in
several articles is the so far underutilisation of social media platforms and tools for
peacebuilding, with the partial exception of Kenya.
Readers of this issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin should also be aware that there are a few
questions raised by the articles that have yet to be adequately answered. A key issue centres on
the statistics on levels of internet penetration in the HoA at present. Several articles cite widely
varying and contradictory figures for internet penetration in the Horn which suggests that
there is a need for further research and more rigorous data.
The articles in this issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin are not only topical in that they discuss a
subject which will assume growing importance in the years to come with expanding internet
access across the region, but also shed light on what is still a little studied area.
Demessie Fantaye, Editor
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ICT4Peace in the Horn of Africa?
By Tedla Desta
The ICT4Peace Literature
The pioneer of peace studies Johan Galtung (1996) proposed two types of peace:
negative peace meaning the absence of violence and positive peace where there is
coexistence, restoration and sustainable absence of violence.[i] Direct violence is
traceable violent action and indirect (structural) violence is violence rooted in the social,
economic, or cultural conditions prevailing within or between societies. Nonviolent
conflict resolution or peacebuilding studies have now diversified with branches on peace
economics, peace journalism, peace and justice and so forth. With the rise of Information
Communication Technologies (ICTs)[ii], the new field that integrates ICTs with
international economic development has emerged and is known as ICT for Development
or ICT4D. In early and mid 2000, capital D started to be succeeded by the big P, ICT for
Peace (ICT4P) inclusive of new techno tools, the Internet and Social Networking Sites
(SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, blogs, and various
other local online forum. Despite the growing hype about ICTs in general and for the
purposes of peacebuilding in particular, some authors raise a moral question about the
oxymoron application of ICT tools for conflict resolution when the very raw materials of
our technological gadgets are sourced or are made through conflict and from conflict
prone regions of the world.[iii] A recent study on the role of ICT in peacebuilding by
Tellidis & Kappler (2016) came up with a conceptual framework of ICTs as tool for
peacebuilding. The authors point to three distinct scenarios: “the hegemonic use of ICTs,
their marginalisation or, alternatively, their use as a representative, participatory tool.”
They conclude from their study that ICTs have to be viewed in “a continuous tension
between disempowerment, marginalisation and empowerment, and activated in different
ways by the agents controlling and using them. This perhaps suggests that ICTs have, in
the field of peacebuilding, a lesser determining role than commonly expected – they
represent but a tool which needs to be activated and used by those capable of and
willing to use it.”[iv]
There are two main schools of thought regarding the role of technologies in
peacebuilding. The techno-optimists, who see the positive, educational, and
emancipatory potential of these tools these include academics, activists, the innovators
of the technology themselves or groups with vested interests such as financers and the
‘cyber-sceptics’, who believe that they could be used for exploitation, surveillance,
cybercrime, and extremism purposes.
The techno-optimists maintain that lack of information leads to misunderstanding and
violence, therefore, the availability of large data and information defuses rumours and
misinformation that could lead to conflict. They also argue that the phases of the conflict
are important. According to Hattotuwa (2004) ICT interventions can be more effective
when used for peacebuilding after a ceasefire or peace agreement. This analysis is
contrary to the perspective purported by Tellidis & Kappler, who find that widespread
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statistically analysing spatially disaggregated data on cell phone coverage and the
location of organised violent events in Africa “the availability of cell phone coverage
significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict.”
The ICT4Peace study and literature is not yet charted but it is destined to be a field of
greater interest due to both the fast development and use of ICT tools around the world
and the increase of ICT related conflicts and insecurities. Specifically, when it comes to
the literature and research for the Horn of Africa (the Horn), the very few articles
available are based on projects in Kenya and these articles focus on the anecdotal
application of technology for conflict prevention or a description of their application
rather than evidences and impacts in sustainable peacebuilding programs or post-
conflict reconciliation and mediation[v]. In a region, where almost all countries currently
are affected by low and high intensity conflicts, where humanitarian crises are rampant,
and the Internet, SNSs and mobile phones have become critical in conflict and security,
reading the regional nexus is quite relevant and important.
Case Studies from the Region
Kenya, with a 68 percent Internet penetration, only preceded in the region by South
Sudan at 71 percent, is broadly viewed as a country aspiring to build a knowledge or
Internet economy[vi]. In the region of repressive states, Kenya has been attempting to
be a place of liberalism and ICT innovation. In Ethiopia, with a 4.5 percent penetration
the ICT and Internet sector is heavily government monopolised and controlled, which is
very similar to the Rwandan model. Somalia with a 6.1 percent penetration is often led
by the private sector and individuals owning and leading technological development.
Cases in the Horn show that the Internet has been used for national economic
developments or what could also be called control by governments and to self organise
and protest government repression by citizens.[vii] In Ethiopia, the government
launched the largest wide area networks (WANs), the WoredaNet, which connects over
600 local administrative districts in the country with broadband Internet access for local
administration efficiency and the SchoolNet to connect more than 550 high schools in
the country to access video-based distance education.[viii] Similar projects such as
AgriNet and RevenueNet have been launched but there are no cases of a PeaceNet or
ConflictNet launched in the whole Horn region perhaps other than the Conflict Early
Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) project of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) region. CEWARN largely focuses on conflict early
warning and analysis in the Horn IGAD member states using a software tool – the
Reporter that collects weekly incident and situation reports. The Techno-sceptics often
argue that SNSs are being used for surveillance or what the optimists might call early
warning and intelligence missions, which the former deem invasive of the privacy and
security of citizens. In the case of, at least, the Horn pastoralist and rural conflict
prevention programs, the CEWARN has showed some value.
There are some individual cases showing the use of ICT for peacebuilding from Kenya.
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preventing genocide and atrocities, a violence prevention program that uses mobile
phones to dispel rumours and misinformation in Kenya’s Tana Delta region, and the Sisi
Ni Amani project, which offers community training on peacebuilding.[ix]  Ushahidi is
crowd-sourcing software developed after the 2007 post election violence in Kenya to
collect and map crises information, was extended and applied to map crises in Gaza,
Afghanistan, Haiti, Chile and to monitor the 2016 election in the US.
In Ethiopia, Kenya as well as countries in the region the use of hashtags (#) for
campaigns and protests has become popular. The #OromoProtests, #AmharaProtests,
#OccupyHarambeeAve or #FeesMustFall were protest (sometimes referred to as
conflict inciting) and campaign hashtags with a short-term goal and recognisable impact.
There is a noticeable absence of either short-term or long-term peacebuilding orientated
hashtags applied for peacebuilding and conflict resolution objectives. It is also not yet
possible to witness if hashtag campaigns of peacebuilding could bring about sustainable
peace or even end conflicts.
Since 2013, several African governments have disrupted or shut down Internet or
electronic communication due to elections or anti-government protests. Since the Arab
Spring wound down, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn became one of
the first leaders to officially disparage social media at the United Nations in September
2016 blaming it for the local protests. The anti-government protests in Ethiopia in 2015
and largely of the 2016 were allegedly mobilised, coordinated, executed and
communicated by local and Diaspora-based activists using social media tools. The
declaration of a State of Emergency by the Ethiopian government in October 2016, the
shutting down of social media helped to de-escalate the protests as well as the
usefulness of the social media for opposition activists.
A study by a local South Sudanese peacebuilding organisation published in 2014 found
that social media particularly Facebook users instrumentally ‘facilitated’ the 2013
conflict in the country.[x] In October 2016, the South Sudan government threatened that
it could cut off access to social media and other online mainstream media “for
circulating ‘false information’ about President Salva Kiir’s health status.”[xi] In 2016
social media activists in the Sudan organised a successful stay-at-home strike opposing
the government but the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir boasted that his government
“will not be overthrown by keyboards” and dared the activists “to come out on to the
streets.”[xii] The events in Sudan suggest that the SNSs indeed can cause a headache to
regimes but other factors are necessary for them to be fully effective. This overview of
the Sudan, Somalia (except a mobile phone SMS assessment), South Sudan[xiii] (a
developed #PeaceApp and peace messaging courses, whose impact has not yet been
evaluated), Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia did not come across unique cases where the
Internet or SNSs tools, software or projects were applied for peacebuilding.
These eventualities indicate that the Internet and SNSs could be very effective tools for
liberation and insurgency however; they could also be employed to impede the successes
of popular causes as governments or Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can easily shut
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unless they are supplemented by practical on-the-ground human actions.
So far the review of the secondary materials and empirical cases of ICT4Peace have not
shown evidence and the impact of the Internet and SNSs used for structural, positive
peace and peacebuilding projects in the HoA region other than few descriptive and
anecdotal cases. The conclusion draws on the limited evidence of a nascent research
field and inclines to the findings of Tellidis & Kappler that for peacebuilding, ICTs
represent a tool “which needs to be activated and used by those capable of and willing to
use it.” It is also worth noting that SNSs are in a process of continuous innovations and
redevelopment, therefore developing a permanent theory and analytical framework or
reaching at a conclusion may not be an uncomplicated undertaking. Users, trends, and
participation are high during crises, special events, and Breaking News announcements
on SNSs, especially in the Horn, and these features gradually reduce or calm in times of
“no news.”
Future Scenario Analysis
The digital divide narrows and more people would be online and the Horn’s sociall
media scene continues to be a chaotic space. Some countries recruit and deploy a
‘social media army’ to dilute and suffocate independent and protesting voices with
pro-government and ‘anti-insurgency or protest messages and malwares’. In line
with this, the digital insecurity or vulnerability of citizens and activists will become
a focus of intervention as well as huge investment and control by governments’
cyber security agencies and Intel branches. Horn governments will follow the
Chinese model of highly controlled Internet and SNSs governance and policy
leading to the ‘hegemonic use of ICTs and then their marginalisation’.
There are hopes and opportunities for the development of digital peacebuilding,l
digital mediation and digital security in the region. This means the cyberspace will
become a place of macro and micro conflicts between major non-state ICT actors,
attackers and hackers versus state actors and multinationals or between ‘Internet
anarchists and controllers’, between individuals and small groups on the
cyberworld such as SNSs. These conflicts could be follow ups of the offline
tensions and conflicts but could also be new digital conflicts and insecurities over
problems that have entirely emanated on the digital world and could best be solved
using innovative digital/cyber peacebuilding or mediation programs. Innovation,
therefore, will be the catchword in the ICT for peace nexus in the region
As much as these technologies could be threatening or forcing reforms ofl
authoritarian regimes in the region (especially with the prospects of Free Basics or
Internet.org), they may also likely save and prolong the lives of dictators. Regimes
could use them to progress their political ends, intelligence or during disasters or
coups – for example recently Turkey’s president Tayyip Erdoğan used FaceTime to
reach his supporters from outside Turkey calling them to successfully take to the
streets and crush down the coup.
The rise of fake news on SNSs is also likely to be a cause of concern with thel
increase of tribalist, ethnic, religious radicalism and extremism themed discourses
and conflicts.
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ETHIOPIA
Mollifying the Web in Ethiopia: Matching Practice to
Policy
By Kinfe Micheal Yilma
Ethiopia is one of the least connected countries in the world. Although Internet was
introduced in Ethiopia as early as 1997, the level of Internet use density remains low.[i]
With recent huge investments – reportedly accounting around 10% of the country’s
Gross Domestic Product – in the country’s Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT) infrastructures, the level of Internet use is gradually growing. Provision of public
and private sector services increasingly rely on Internet protocol based technologies.
Ethiopia also has one of the largest social media user bases in Africa. It is now evident
that the use of and reliance on Internet – and allied technologies – is set to grow in the
coming years.
This growing reliance on Internet-enabled technologies, however, exposes the country to
various forms of risks such as threats of cyber-attacks against the country’s critical
infrastructures that are crucial for provision of vital public and private services. Ethiopia
is not new to the world of cyber-attacks from overseas. Hundreds of hacking and
defacement of government websites occurred in the past decade but these had limited
economic or political ramifications at the time.[ii] This appears to be changing over time,
however. More recently, the country has been gripped by reports of an attack against a
major private bank from which a huge sum of money was stolen.[iii]
Recent turn of events have also signalled threats to peace and security that the country
is bound to face as it moves to fully join the information society. The anti-government
protests in some parts of the country – mediated largely through social media platforms
– had shaken the nation’s stability to its core. The street protests were initially
accompanied by random hacking and defacement of government websites thereby
opening up a new form of airing dissent – hacktivism.[iv] This later grew into what now
come to be referred to as ‘hybrid’ cyber-attacks, in the form of ‘disinformation’
campaigns and circulation of ‘fake news’ in social media platforms.
An example of such misleading or false information circulating on social media was the
bogus accusation that the cause for a deadly stampede in October 2016 in Bishoftu was
the unprovoked police shooting from a helicopter on people attending a festival, had
perilous consequences.[v] This led to ‘five days of rage’ by misinformed youth against
public and private properties ultimately prompting a state of emergency. The declaration
of the emergency – which still is in place – for the first time in a quarter of a century,
speaks to the emerging significant impact of ICTs and social media will have on the
stability of the nation.
What made these social media mediated violent protests significant is the key role that
the social media are poised to play in shaping the domestic peace and security dynamics
in Ethiopia. With increasing access to the Internet, social media will soon be an
important variable in gauging Ethiopia’s internal stability. With the apparent
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militarisation of cyberspace – and of course visible signs of cyber conflict, threats to the
country’s critical Internet infrastructure from adversaries appear to be insidious.
Moreover, the fact that most of the ‘hybrid’ attacks emerge from overseas by actors
actively working with the hostile government regime in Eritrea makes the situation more
precarious.
Internet Policy Making in Ethiopia
Recent developments should not, however, be a reason to adopt a pessimistic vision of
the Internet or social media. Over regulation – or an overly securitised vision of the
fledgling Ethiopian new media landscape – might stand in the way of properly exploiting
the benefits that these technologies offer. What is needed, instead, are well thought out
policy principles and well equipped institutions to enforce them. Of course, the Ethiopian
government has generally been progressive in rolling out relevant policy and legal
instruments to effectively address the Internet and threats that its (mis)use could pose.
Ethiopia issued its first national ICT Policy in 2002, which has since been updated in
2009 and 2016.
The nation’s ICT policy mandates the need to put in place the requisite legal and
institutional framework to exploit the benefits of ICTs while also countering their
possible threat to national peace and security. A fairly elaborate Cybersecurity Policy
has also been adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2011.This policy updates the
country’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy (2002) in the context of the digital
space, and underlies that information security forms an integral part of national security,
public peace and security.[vi]
These policy instruments are translated into a number of legal instruments, and several
others are in the offing. More recent pieces of legislation include the Telecom Fraud
Offense Proclamation (Proclamation No. 761/2012) and the Computer Crime
Proclamation (Proclamation No. 958/2016). The telecom fraud offense legislation –
contrary to the narrow scope that its nomenclature might suggest – covers a broad range
of matters including offenses that concern domestic peace and security. Indeed, the law
explicitly stipulates that telecom fraud, over and above the economic losses it results in,
may threaten the national security of the country.[vii] The cybercrime law likewise
penalises a number of crimes that threaten peace and security in general and
cybersecurity in particular.[viii]
Institutions with statutory powers to implement and enforce these policies instruments
have also been installed. A principal such government agency is the Information
Network Security Agency which is tasked, inter alia, to protect the country’s critical
infrastructures from possible attacks.[ix] The National Intelligence and Security
Service’s general power to collect intelligence on matters of national security including
those of cybersecurity makes it another important body in the area.[x] The Federal
Police is tasked to investigate crimes relating to information network and computer
systems, alongside its general role of maintaining peace and security.[xi] Other bodies
such as the former Ministry of Justice – now the Federal Attorney General and the
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Ministry of Communication and Information Technology also assume some roles in
dealing with threats to national peace security posed in the cyber front. At a judicial
level, the Federal First Instance court has a subject matter jurisdiction to adjudge cases
relating to ICTs in general while cases under the recent cybercrime legislation fall under
the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.[xii]
Matching Practice to Policy
Ethiopia’s progress in the policy field does not, however, match well with the practice.
Despite relatively modern and comprehensive policies and laws already in place, little
appears to have been achieved in terms of translating these policy principles into
actions. The government often resorts to piecemeal and reactive measures in dealing
with emerging cyber threats. This, in turn, has substantially robbed them of efficacy,
efficiency, and sustainability in aptly overcoming the ever growing cyber threats. The
legality of some of these measures – both under domestic and international law – is
mooted. A few examples illustrate the rift between policy and practice.
One is that the Ethiopian government increasingly relies on temporary closure of social
media sites – and sometimes nationwide Internet shutdowns, blocking, and filtering of
certain websites – to quell dissent channelled via the web. These measures have
repeatedly been taken during the recent protest in some parts of the country. Besides
the legality issues that such measures bring up as well as their significant effect on the
economy, it is doubtful whether these measures have resulted in sustainable peace in
the country. Similar rounds of social media mediated violence could occur at some point.
With increasing use of circumvention tools, blocking of websites is already proving futile.
And that Internet shutdowns have broader legal, economic, and diplomatic ramifications
makes their utility lower. In the course of implementing these measures, there were also
instances of major technical errors affecting the whole Internet system, a fact admitted
even by a government spokesperson.
The recent unrest has also prompted the government to consider creating what it calls a
‘social media army’ to counter circulation of misleading information and falsehood in
social media. To this effect, the Council of Minister’s has adopted a Regulation that
establishes an Institute that would train members of this ‘army’.[xiii] From all that we
know so far, it appears that the government is resorting to similar measures taken in
other countries such as Iran and China of infusing social media platforms with users
loyal to the government. By running ideologically polemic information on the web, such
methods do more harm than good by burdening free flow of information and expression.
Instead of overcoming falsehoods that upset the domestic peace matrix, chances are that
‘social media soldiers’ might distort the truth and reinforce the real threats of ‘fake
news’.
Another measure taken by the government is to deploy Internet surveillance tools
against persons believed to pose threats to national security. This path does not seem to
be taking the government a long way in ensuring domestic peace and security as recent
developments suggested that these cyber tools have not been used judiciously. The
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government is also known to be taking a heavy-handed approach against the fledgling
community of local bloggers. Prosecution of these bloggers for vague crimes including a
controversial charge for using encryption tools has been unprecedented. [xiv]The
government’s goal of maintaining peace and security could have been very well
reinforced by tolerating civil discussion in online platforms. Heavy-handed approaches
by the government against peaceful dissenters is likely to push them to the extreme and
take the path of violence and even disinformation campaigns, which then threatens
peace and security.
Maintaining domestic peace and security – including cybersecurity – requires a
coordinated, sustainable and goal-oriented approach towards the Internet and its
potential for good or bad. In translating the goals set out in the above policy documents,
the government must enhance the institutional capacity of all bodies tasked with
regulating the Ethiopian web. The technical nature of the Internet requires qualified
experts in investigation, prosecution and even in adjudication processes. The global
nature of the web also dictates a reliable international cooperation mechanism including
with regional bodies. As a prominent member of the African Union (AU), Ethiopia should
even take the lead in ratifying the AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data
Protection (2014), and engage towards realizing a robust regional cybersecurity regime.
While the recent move by the government to take the matter more seriously is a positive
development, it is vital that the measures that will follow are well thought-out and
pragmatic to ensure legality, sustainability, feasibility and efficiency. Pragmatic
measures of pacifying the Ethiopian web will ultimately yield not only economically but
also diplomatically. Ethiopia’s leading role in regional peace and security efforts also
makes it imperative, not only to maintain its domestic stability, but also to lead by
example.
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KENYA
Social Media, Community Policing and the ‘Digitisation’ of
public participation in Kenya
By Duncan Omanga
Since the turn of the century, the mobile phone and the growth of the internet is
changing how Africans interface with power. Scholars on Africa have shown how local
participation in governance issues has been energised through these developments.[i]
The Arab spring, which began in Tunisia in 2010 has stimulated increasing interest in
how social media mobilises people and convenes publics in Africa.[ii] With visible shift in
social media, especially in the explicit ‘convoking logics’ such as ‘liking’ ’friending’ and
‘following’, the convergence of social media and mobile telephony is central to new
debates on how digital publics are constituted in Africa. In the book, “Mobile Phones:
The new Talking Drums of everyday Africa” the term ‘revolution’ is deployed to
characterise the massive changes in Africa occasioned by the use and rapid spread of
mobile telephones in the continent.[iii] These transformations are not merely limited to
communication, but can also be observed in multiple domains such as the political,
where they mediate between social individuals and groups, creating new forms of social
mediation, where various kinds of agency emerge.
In Africa today, the use and impact of the social media are huge, to say the least. This
situation has been bolstered by the increase in mobile telephony which has made access
to the internet convenient and easy. According to a British Broadcasting Corporation’s
(BBC) report, the number of subscribers on the continent has grown almost 20 percent
each year for the past five years, and it is expected that there are more than 735 million
subscribers today in Africa. Meanwhile, huge submarine cable infrastructure has seen an
increased growth of internet access in the entire continent.
According to the latest statistics from the Communications Commissions of Kenya,
mobile phone subscriptions stand at slightly over 38.9 million out of a population of
about 43 million people (87 percent). Additionally, a similar number of Kenyans have
access or subscriptions to the internet (87.9 percent) and slightly more than half this
number access the internet through their phones.[iv] It is the mostly younger
subscribers in this category that have facilitated the meteoric rise of the social media in
Kenya and the rest of Africa. The combination of social media and smartphones have
‘liberated’ and emancipated mediated communication from the centre (state and
institutions) and given more agency to ordinary individuals insofar as political debate
and action is concerned. In a context of political devolution, social media has become an
important aspect of how citizens in Kenya mobilise, and how they, through both
discourse and social action, imagine and reconstruct their relation to the state. Today,
besides connecting friends and groups, social media has become an integral aspect of
Kenya’s social and political dynamics and has been effectively used in driving positive
change like community policing, galvanising and channelling public discontent,
grassroots political mobilisation.
In this article, I wish to highlight how social media has been deployed in the county of
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Nakuru, in central Kenya first, by state actors to support community policing and second
by ordinary citizens for the non-formal political deliberation at the grassroots. In both
cases, I argue, social media provides specific affordances previously not available, which
affects agency, grassroots empowerment and reproduces a more accountable local
governance.
 
Social Media, Chiefs and Community Policing in Nakuru
The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya marked a watershed moment for forty-year-old
Francis Kariuki. The school where he served as a head teacher was badly affected by the
violence and he felt working directly with the locals would be a much better challenge.
When a chief’s job fell vacant in Lanet Umoja location, Nakuru County, he quickly turned
in an application. But he was least prepared for the sudden shift from dealing with
honest, innocent children to the rigours that comes with being in charge of the entire
location of more than 30,000 residents. His job now includes chairing the local security
committee with village elders, assistant chiefs, and opinion leaders. With two
administration police seconded to him to ensure he executes his mandate he is loved and
loathed in equal measure depending on who you talk to. He reports to the District
Officer (DO) every other week although hardly a day passes before he makes or receives
a call from the DO. More important, he must hold a baraza (open public meetings) at
least twice, in a month. The more barazas he convenes the better for his resume. His
adoption of Twitter as in interactive platform with members of his location was
accidental. According to Chief Kariuki, the initial idea of getting onto Twitter was merely
to send notifications of upcoming baraza meetings without the inconvenience and
expense of pinning up public notices.
Chief Kariuki began constituting his initial Twitter ‘followers’ with the handful of baraza
attendees who would occasionally peak at 150 people. At the baraza, he would show
residents how to ‘follow’ him on Twitter. He assured them that the new initiative would
allow access to the chief at all times with no costs on their part. While a few managed to
subscribe to the micro-blogging site, the lack of internet enabled smart phones and the
difficulty of navigating the social media for first time users was a challenge. But since
almost everyone had access to a mobile phone however simple it was, he negotiated with
a mobile network provider, who linked his Twitter account to a unique four-digit number
which allowed his tweets to bounce off this number and instantly appear as a short
message (SMS) to anyone linked to the four-digit number. Subscription to the four-digit
number proved easy and practical. Villagers would only be required to send the message
‘follow @Chief Francis’ to this number and from then on would receive the Chiefs’
tweets in the form of an SMS. Later, all his three assistants, Florence, Mundia and
Maina joined Twitter (@AsChief Florence, @AsChiefMundia@ AsChiefMaina), and using
the same code, all these platforms formed a network that changed local
administration.[v] At present, Chief Kariuki has over 56,000 followers on his twitter
handle. The assistant Chiefs have a combined following of over 3000 followers.
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The use of Twitter and mobile phones for community policing in Lanet Umoja is a huge
success. Usually, once a crime or an emergency occurs, the victim or a neighbour
informs one of the chiefs through a text message, the Chief in turn, retweets to other
chiefs and it is instantly shared. Twitter produces a space, or a ´digital baraza´ where
speed, simplicity and immediacy converge to make potent tool for community policing.
The platforms show a pattern of crimes and related emergencies that are reported and
addressed instantly through group action. In the texts below for instance (in Kiswahili),
the chief posts that a house belonging to one mama Gathoni is being burgled, he calls
out the public to help, singling out those living in the area known as ‘murunyu’, then the
burglars, having most probably received the texts on their phones too, hurriedly leave
the scene (Figure 1). Members rise from their sleep to help a neighbour in the full
knowledge and assurance that a significant number of people will respond.
Figure 1 See translation [vi]
 
WhatsApp, Tweet-ups and Public Participation in Nakuru Local Governance
At well over sixty-years-old, Elijah Kinyanjui hardly fits the stereotype of the typical
African blogger. A native of Nakuru town, Kinyanjui is a veteran journalist who has
worked for all the notable media houses in Kenya as a print journalist and has,
depending on who you ask, established himself as one of Nakuru County’s most
prominent bloggers. In early 2013, he set up the news blog ‘Nakuru County Online’,
whose focus was primarily news relevant to the county of Nakuru. His experiment with
local county news was in the spirit of Kenya’s new constitution of 2010 that primarily
sought to devolve the formal and informal structures and discourses of governance.
According to Kinyanjui[vii], the newspaper failed due to technical issues. He transferred
the blog to a Facebook page and renamed it the Nakuru Analysts, a name that suggested
the deliberative objective of the page, and also its socio-political scope. Although the
Facebook version of Nakuru Analysts still runs, it is not as politically sharp as its
WhatsApp affiliate. According to information on the group profile, Nakuru Analysts was
constituted as a WhatsApp group on 23 January 2015, with Elijah Kinyanjui, and Jane
Kinuthia (Jenny) as administrators of the group. Following its successes in convening
and bringing into being a digital public, where members engaged in what they felt were
deliberative acts on the affairs of the county government, Nakuru Analysts was
registered as a community based organisation (CBO) in December 2015 and interim
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officials were elected to run the social arm of the organisation. A man named Hamisi
Mutura was appointed Chairman, Jane Kinuthia became the group’s treasurer, and
Patrick Kinyua was its secretary.[viii] Elijah Kinyanjui remained the chief executive
officer (CEO) of Nakuru Analysts in a non-electable capacity. According to interviews
with the original founding administrators of the group[ix], the new CBO was to act as a
bridge between discourse and action, or what is sometimes known broadly as ‘Tweet-
ups’, where digitally convened publics meet face-to-face with the intention of actualising
specific action (In Nakuru this includes such things as urban protests, fund raisers, and
meetings summoned to encourage and ‘anoint’ specific political aspirants).
The Nakuru Analysts was envisioned as a digitally-convened space where ordinary
citizens had an equal chance of posing relevant questions and getting the answers from
the county officials concerned. Using his networks, Kinyanjui collected the contacts of
the Governor,´County officials, County Cabinet Secretaries and elected members of the
County Assembly, and linked them together with those of several opinion leaders, future
political aspirants, business people, and professionals to form the Nakuru Analysts.
Whilst the group comprised of a specific social category, the vast majority of current
WhasApp members are ordinary engaged citizens of Nakuru County.
In the Nakuru Analysts WhatsApp group, debate is informed by both argument and
comparisons with other counties that are perceived to be doing generally well, as a basis
for evaluating the performance of the Nakuru county government. For instance, on 30
August 2016, a participant posted a picture of a famous refurbished public market in
Mombasa County. The picture elicited praise for Mombasa Governor Hassan Joho, but
also prompted debates on unfulfilled campaign promises in Nakuru County:
Mike: Comparing Kongowea Market and Nasher (local Nakuru county
market) is like comparing day and night.
Elijah Kinyanjui: Wow…it really puts Nakuru County government to shame
for lack of a similar project.
Miguel: Kongowea market used to be dusty place for campaigns and drug
peddling, amazing transformation.
31 August 2016 (Nakuru Analysts, 20:32-2038)
Often, the convergence of online news and social media, and the convenience of mobile
phone nourish local debates and stimulate further comparisons between counties. These
comparisons aid in the energising of local debates, and for calling to account of the
county government.
Gitau: *Can Nakuru Learn from Kiambu County? * The Kiambu
government’s Youth Affairs department has launched a mobile loan service
called Mobiloan. Applicants will access it using mobile phone money
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transfer services. Governor William Kabogo on Wednesday said the county,
through its Biashara Fund, has partnered with the Kenya Commercial Bank
to make the service possible…Kabogo said the service will allow the youth,
women and persons living with disability easy access to money to grow their
businesses…..
Nono: This is what we need in this county, but with an allocation of Kes. 65
million for youth and all this go to the construction of polytechnics it will
remain a mirage unless KM is interdicted (sic)
01 January 2016 (Nakuru Analysts, 1:57 -2:02 pm)
Nakuru Analysts remains a powerful space for the formation of a prototype digital public
that is able to engage in the critical debates that matter to the locals. Often, not only
does it call the county government to account directly through its dialogue with
members of the county government, but the platform uses the digital space to explain
and debate how county governments work.
Conclusion
While the constitutionally recognised spaces of participation and meaning making for
ordinary citizens with regard to County governance and accountability are public
participation forums, the popularity and vibrancy of WhatsApp groups like Nakuru
Analyst, shows how digital publics are complementing, and often outdoing, other
traditional, formal spaces of deliberation. At the same time, the affordances of digital
media and the attribute of convergence allows Kenyan chiefs to repurpose and refashion
the classic baraza and mobilise it for social action. In the case of Lanet Umoja in Nakuru,
Twitter routinely summoned a public that acted corporately (to a degree) to the
substance of the texts that constituted it. This active ‘social action’ went beyond a mere
perfunctory attention, but imposed an urgent responsibility and obligation on citizens.
Thus, the use of Twitter by local chiefs in Nakuru and the powerful role played by
WhatsApp groups in Nakuru town show how the affordances of social media combines
with the convenience of internet enabled smart phones to empower ordinary citizens.
This is attained through the capacity of social media to convene groups for specific
action, and at the same time, the possibility of social media in facilitating a continuous
conversation among a dispersed audience. This quality of social media, according to Clay
Shirky, qualifies to be labelled a revolution.
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SOUTH SUDAN
Webs of peace and conflict: diasporic engagement in
South Sudan
By Freddie Carver
Given the low levels of internet penetration in South Sudan[i] and poor
telecommunications infrastructure, it might be thought that the internet is of little
relevance to the conflict there. However, it has become a key enabler of a system of
interaction and communication amongst a South Sudanese population that has become
ever more globalised after more than 50 years of conflict and forced displacement. This
includes a significant and currently growing population of both refugees and more
settled communities in the region, particularly in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan
(what might be called the ‘near diaspora’) as well as communities further afield,
predominantly in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, many of
whom were resettled in the 1990s and 2000s (the ‘far diaspora’). Statistics on all of
these populations are poor, but collectively the total number of people is in the millions
(with the population of South Sudan estimated in 2015 to have been 12.34 million[ii]).
The extended nature of South Sudanese kinship systems mean that it is therefore likely
that the vast majority of South Sudanese citizens have networks reaching into these
locations. Current telecommunications technology enables these networks to operate in
new and important ways.
Studies on diasporic engagement with conflict have been a feature of the conflict
literature of the last 20 years, including in relation to Ethiopia and Somalia, but with a
very limited focus on South Sudan. Since Collier and Hoeffler’s landmark finding in
2004, that “a large diaspora considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict”[iii], much
of this research has emphasised the negative role played by diaspora communities.
Typical stereotypes, both of which are prevalent in the South Sudan context, include:
at one end of the spectrum, the “keyboard warrior”, inciting violence and hatredl
from safety thousands of miles away, perhaps even contributing financially to
armed groups;
and, on the other, those without much understanding of the realities on the groundl
but with an inflated sense of the role they can play thanks to qualifications and
experiences they have gained in their new homes, and who return to the country
with a patronising attitude and easy escape routes.
As with most stereotypes, there is a grain of truth in these characterisations, but they
obscure both the complexity and the importance of diasporic engagement, and how it
has evolved with technological advances.
The starting point, therefore, needs to be a more objective understanding of how this
system actually operates and the opportunities and challenges it may present. While the
psychological and geographical distance between individuals in, say, Australia, who may
be struggling with unemployment and discrimination, and South Sudanese communities
facing immediate threats of hunger and violence are indeed significant, regular
communication starts to narrow this divide. Tools such as WhatsApp, Viber, and Skype
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enable this communication to happen in a much more regular way, and even where
internet connections do not exist at the South Sudanese end, can be used to connect
directly to phones. This starts to undermine the reliance on traditional gatekeepers with
access to satellite phones: satphones (often military commanders) or international
organisations’ VSat networks, and enables information to be shared more widely and
rapidly. It means that the conversation taking place online, whether on social media
(particularly Facebook) or via blogging websites such as www.PaanLuwelWel.com, is
able reach those in rural areas. Disturbingly – and as has been documented
elsewhere[iv] – this raises the prospect of ‘fake news’ and rumour being used to mobilise
violence in specific locations, but it also presents significant opportunities. In a country
where so much of the population is often inaccessible due to insecurity and logistical
challenges, it provides a potential entry point for providing these communities with
access to more reliable information, as well as giving them a more meaningful a voice
about the future of the country.
This complex information network places an important responsibility on all those
involved in providing information and analysis on South Sudan online to reflect seriously
about the potential impact of what they produce – at all possible levels. One example
provides an illustration of the challenge: Australian-based SBS (Special Broadcasting
Service) Radio’s Dinka Service. SBS radio is an Australian institution focussed on
providing access to diverse media to Australia’s many linguistic communities in the
interests of community confidence and integration, and after the growth of the South
Sudanese community there in the 2000s decided to add a Dinka programme to its roster.
Being online has enabled this programme to become one of the most prominent and
regular sources of news and information in Dinka worldwide. It is accessed by the
community across the world (including in South Sudan where it can be distributed
offline e.g. via MicroSD cards compatible with basic smart phones) and attracts high-
profile interviews with leaders from the Dinka community. This is a very different
proposition from that originally intended, largely outside the control of those who
launched the initiative in Australia.
The network also creates new opportunities for financial transfers and remittances,
which act as an important glue to the relationship between those inside and outside the
country. Again, there is inadequate data available on the extent of remittance flows[v],
but anecdotally they are clearly significant and will have only grown in importance as
the value of the South Sudanese Pound has fallen. Direct transfers from abroad into
remote areas of South Sudan are challenging due to the lack of access to banking
facilities. Therefore, it appears that the ‘near diaspora’, many of whom are in countries
such as Kenya and Uganda with access to mobile banking networks and who are able to
more easily move back and forth into the country and access the informal networks that
operate there, play an important bridging role. There is also consistent anecdotal
evidence of financial support to armed groups operating along similar channels[vi]. The
systems that enable these financial flows need to be understood far better if the war
economy of the country is to be fully grasped.
It is also critical to recognise the fluidity that exists within this network, and which the
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term ‘diaspora’, suggesting a fixed group operating from outside the country, does not
adequately capture. There are a large group of people able to operate in multiple
locations at once, providing direct physical connections between different geographical
locations. Most obvious are the elites who, as 2016’s Sentry report[vii]  documented,
tend to have their families spread over multiple locations for purposes of maximizing
education and investment opportunities, and who move back and forth regularly. This
enables, for example, Members of Parliament who are traveling while parliament is on
recess to hold community consultations in Calgary or Phoenix.
Beyond that, there are individuals that work for companies or aid organisations with an
international presence who move between multiple locations, prominent activists or
opinion leaders who no longer feel safe in the country (Riek Machar is arguably
currently the most high profile diaspora member worldwide), and individuals that have
sought to return to South Sudan to bring their new skills and experiences to bear, both
for personal profit and public service (and, in recent years, for the purposes of
participating in armed violence). While regular travel from distant locations is beyond
those without significant resources, the movements in and out of the country are
extensive, particularly around the time of independence, and ensures that these webs of
connections are more meaningful than is suggested by the stereotypes outlined above.
While the fact that conflicts are closely connected with dynamics and actors beyond their
national borders is hardly new, the combination of accelerated global migration and
modern communication technologies does mean that the communities affected by the
conflict are more widely dispersed and interact more directly with events on the ground.
The question for those seeking to have an impact on conflict dynamics is what risks and
opportunities this presents.
There are undoubtedly challenges to seeking to engage with these networks. South
Sudanese diaspora communities are often polarised and fragmented, with ethnic identity
a primary organising principle and the on-going violence taking place in the country
continues to damage trust and relationships on all sides. This fragmentation is one of the
driving factors behind the high level of online hate speech, something that has become
increasingly high profile in the last year thanks to the work of organisations such as
Peace Tech Labs[viii] and #defyhatenow[ix], and has recently been highlighted by the
UN Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide[x]. Their work has illustrated
the feasibility of using online monitoring as an early warning system for violence within
South Sudan, as well as raising awareness amongst South Sudanese about bottom-up
methodologies to combat hate speech online. Thinking is also emerging about ways in
which those governments that host diaspora communities might be able to use domestic
legislation to prosecute those responsible. These issues should also form part of the
growing global debate around the responsibilities of the biggest social media companies
in ensuring their sites are not used for criminal purposes.
Nonetheless, it is essential that this issue is not solely framed along negative lines, and
the potential for these diaspora networks to enable positive change is fully explored and,
where appropriate, supported. There are many individuals and groups within diaspora
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communities that recognise the opportunity they have to speak more freely than those
inside the country, and who are seeking to break down tribal divides and promote
alternative visions of South Sudan – they can be found blogging or setting up community
development organisations or lobbying governments for action. Efforts are underway at
the moment to develop a global diaspora network to increase the coherence and
effectiveness of these efforts, and while the unity aspired to will undoubtedly be
challenging to obtain, this represents important social capital that can be of benefit to
South Sudan. If those involved can make the most of the web of interactions and
relationships described above, helping give a voice to those who too often do not feature
in discussions about South Sudan’s future, then such efforts could become a powerful
tool to drive positive change in the country.
There may also be a limited time window for harnessing this energy, at least from the
‘far diaspora’, although this issue needs further study. Much of the migration out of the
region took place in the 1990s and 2000s, and is unlikely to be repeated at scale given
the current domestic attitude to immigration in many of the host countries. The door has
therefore largely shut behind this community, and while many individuals still retain a
strong connection back to the “homeland” this may start to weaken as time passes,
particularly as the baton is handed to a generation that have never known South Sudan
themselves.
There is therefore an onus on international policymakers seeking to improve the
situation in the country to think harder about this system, particularly given the lack of
leverage and influence that the international system currently appears to have in the
country. The first step is to understand it better and to start to fill in the gaps in our
collective evidence base. But if this can be done, then for the United States government,
for example, the opportunities that should arise to engage directly with these
communities, as well as to work with the American technology companies that are so
deeply enmeshed with them, might provide valuable new threads of a more
comprehensive strategy on South Sudan.
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HORN OF AFRICA
Internet shutdowns as major constraints for digital
political activism in the Horn of Africa
By Mengnjo Tardzenyuy Thomas
At the dawn of the 21st century, the Internet is increasingly being used by citizens
around the globe as leverage for political expression and to hold governments
accountable for their actions. But in authoritarian regimes especially on the African
Continent, the use of Internet for citizens’ activism is often interrupted by these regimes,
whenever they perceive that its use by any political actor might jeopardise their political
offices. Summarily, digital political activism in this write up refers to a situation where
digital tools such as internet, mobile phones, and social media are used to bring political
change. It is aimed at serving five main functions which amongst other things include:
shaping public opinion, planning an action, sharing a call to action, taking action
digitally, and the transfer of resources. Through online political activism, large
communities can be connected around the globe[i]. On the other end, the Horn of Africa
(the Horn) in this context refers to the Eastern Region of Africa which is comprised of
the following countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan,
and Uganda[ii]. Some of these countries according to Njiraini Muchira (2016) are among
the top violators of freedom of expression online[iii].
Online suppression in these countries have over the years been manifested through
internet shutdowns, principally masterminded by governments, powerful states such as
the United States (US) and terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab. Nonetheless, shutting
down the internet no matter its justification, contravenes Article 20 of the Twentieth-
Session of the United Nation (UN) Human Rights Council’s Agenda 3 on: “The
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet”[iv]. As such, in
disregard of this resolution, a number of factors have over the years been held
accountable for internet shutdowns experienced in the Horn. Internet shutdowns in
these countries have not only manifested themselves in diverse ways but have equally
stifled citizens’ basic human rights to freedom of expression online.
The justification and manifestation of internet shutdowns in the Horn of Africa
From the eight countries in the Horn identified above, internet disruptions have
occurred in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In justification for Internet shutdown,
Kifle Eskedar has intimated that most governments wholly or partly disrupt the
operation of internet services due to national security, public safety, economic reasons,
and to maintain control [v]. In addition to these justifications, Philip, N. Howard, Sheetal,
D. Agarwal, and Muzammi, M. Hussain have further contended that governments disrupt
digital networks in order to protect political leaders and states institutions, prevent
election crises, eliminate propaganda, and to mitigate dissidents [vi]. Relative to the
foregoing, it should be underscored here that, internet shutdowns in the Horn can be
explained from two main angles, that is, from the perspective of governments and from
the standpoint of other political actors such as the United States government and
extremist organisations such as the Al Shabaab.
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Many governments in the Horn consider the internet especially during electoral periods
as a threat to their continuous grip on state power and hence, are often willing to use
whatever means at their disposal to prevent the dissemination of any information which
might likely shape public opinion against their political power. In the wake of the 2016
Ugandan Presidential Election, the Ugandan government blocked the Internet on
February 8th. This shutdown was intended to stifle the spread of online messages linked
to the forceful arrest of the main opposition contestant, Dr. Kizza Besigye and alleged
human rights abuses orchestrated by the police on members of the opposition few days
to the election. Furthermore, the Internet shutdown was also aimed at paralysing
Besigye’s online platform popularly known as “Power 10” (P10), which was constructed
to monitor polling operations and to report any cases of electoral malpractices
nationwide[vii].
Secondly, internet shutdowns in the Horn have also been aimed at repressing citizens’
organised mass protests against the government in situ. Examples abound. In October
2016 the Ethiopian government blocked the Internet as a pre-emptive measure to halt
the viral spread of online messages, which were mobilising citizens to participate in
protests against the government of Ethiopia. According to the Ethiopian Prime Minister,
Hailemariam Desalegn, the internet in this scenario was used as a tool to “spread
messages of hate and bigotry without any inhibition”[viii].
Aside from the foregoing governments related motives, internet shutdowns in the Horn
also have exogenous roots. For instance, in November 2001, the United States coerced
Somalia’s telecommunication firm, Somalia Internet Company and a money transfer
company, Al Barakaat, to close down their Internet services. The U.S. suspected these
companies of terrorist links as plainly elaborated by the British Broadcasting
Corporation’s (BBC) Network African Program in the following words: “The two
firms…both appear on a US list of organisations accused of funnelling money to the al-
Qaeda network and featured in a UN Security Council resolution”[ix].
In another focus, threats from extremist groups have also led to Internet shutdown in the
Horn. In February 2014, the largest telecommunication company in Somalia, Hormuud,
was forced by the Al Shabaab, to shut down the provision of its internet services. From
the standpoint of Al Shabaab, officials of this company were western spies and Christian
crusaders[x]. In this light, Abdi Aynte, a Somali Analyst at the Heritage Institute of
Policy Studies contended that Al Shabaab’s intimidatory move for Internet shutdown was
as a consequence of the realism that, they were: “…afraid that this technology will be
used to track some of their top fighters as the operations of drones permeate in the
areas that al Shabaab controls in South and Central Somalia”[xi]. In order to justify their
Internet shutdown, one of the officials of this telecommunication company in his position
statement affirmed that they had no other option than to close down their internet
operations as follows: “I don’t think we had another alternative … we are just business
people and cannot confront an armed group’s orders”[xii].
From the foresaid, it is apparent that Internet shutdowns are the main obstacles to
digital political activism in the Horn. Most political actors seldom reflect on the
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consequences of shutting down the Internet[xiii]. To this end, Internet shutdowns in the
Horn have obstructed citizens from freely expressing their opinions online. This
contravenes Article 20 of the UN Human Rights Resolution. For instance, in June 2016,
the UN while underscoring that the right of expression through the internet should be
respected by all countries observed as follows: “Deeply concerned by all human rights
violations and abuses committed against persons for exercising their human rights and
fundamental freedoms on the Internet, and by the impunity for these violations and
abuses…Deeply concerned also by measures aiming to or that intentionally prevent or
disrupt access to or dissemination of information online, in violation of international
human rights law”[xiv].
Besides denying citizens the right to freely express themselves online, the economic
repercussions of Internet shutdowns have also been expensive in the Horn. According to
a study carried out by the Brookings Institute and Global Network Initiative (GNI),
Ethiopia lost about US $500,000 per day in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) when the
government shutdown the internet in 2016[xv], while the Ugandan economy also lost
close to about US $26 million during its internet shutdown in 2016[xvi]. Apart from
Internet shutdowns, other underlining factors hindering digital political activism in the
Horn include: illiteracy in Internet usage, inadequate developed telecommunication
infrastructures, and low online political culture.
Policy recommendations
In order to curtail the disruption of the Internet and to avert its consequences in the
Horn, the following policy recommendations are necessary:
There is need for governments in the Horn to develop the spirit of online1.
tolerance which is one of the basic tenets of democracy. Online tolerance would
mean willingness to accept online criticisms from opponents by translating them
into good policy options.
There is also need for sensitisation programs to be organised in order to enhance2.
the capacities of both governmental officials and the citizens on the responsible
use of the internet. These programs are crucial so as to better educate
governmental officials on the repercussions of internet shutdowns on the one
hand, and to sensitise internet users to avoid online hate speech and to use the
internet responsibly.
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